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BISSING V. BRITTON
BISSIG v. BRITTON.1
Is a promise by one party to indemnify another against
loss by his becoming surety for a third party, a promise to
answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another so as to
bring the case within the provisions of the Statute of Frauds,
or is it an original, independent agreement between the prom-
isor and promisee and valid although merely an oral state..
ment? As many learned writers attempt to explain, the
problem concerns itself unnecessarily with the word indem-
nity. However, it is not this alone which determines whether
the contract is within the Statute of Frauds, but the real
liability of the promisor to reimburse the promisee ixre-
spective of any duty owing from the principal or original
debtor to the later surety. Williston, in a recent work on
contracts, states that the important consideration is not the
term indemnity but "the contingency against which the
promisor undertook to indemnify. It is a primary question
whether the promisor agrees not merely to indemnify
but to indemnify for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another."
It is universally conceded that the statute in question
applies only to those promises made to a person to whom
another is answerable. Nevertheless, it seems to be the reason-
able view, that when one becomes surety for a debtor at the
request of another this forms a special agreement between
such surety and promisor, the consideration being the sep-
arate undertaking to reimburse, without which the surety
would not have become a party to the transaction. In such
cases, it is not the debtor's duty, express or implied, to com-
pensate the surety which induces the latter to sign his bond
or note, but the distinct obligation of the indemnitor to save
1. 59 Mo. 204.
2. 2 Esp. 404.
3. 8 B. & C. 728.
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him harmless from any loss which he may subsequently incur.
The weight of modern English authorities maintains that
such a promise of indemnity is not governed by the Statute
of Frauds. The earliest case involving this question is that
of Winkworth v. Mills, 2 which decided that a promise of
indemnity was within the Statute. Later, there were
three leading English cases decided respectively in 1828, 1839
and 1874, which show clearly the unsettled trend of opinion
and afford a brief history of the situation. In the first of
these, Thomas v. Cook,3 the doctrine of Winkworth v. Mills
was overthrown and the oral promise of the defendant to
reimburse the plaintiff in becoming surety on a bond was held
not to be within the Statute of Frauds and valid.
But the justices of England were not content with this
doctrine. In 1839, Thomas v. Cook was overruled by Green v.
Creswell,4 in which a promise of the defendant to indemnify
the plaintiff in joining on a bail bond was considered a
promise to answer for the debt or default of another and
within the Statute of Frauds. The former opinion which sup-
ported oral agreements to indemnify was repudiated as un-
satisfactory and as tending to create the same mischief which
the Statute had been enacted to overcome. It was not long,
however, until the Court again reversed itself by the decision
of Wildes v. Dudlow.5 Here, the oral promise of A to save B
harmless if he would guarantee C's debt was held to c5nsti-
tute an independent liability in A capable of enforcement
regardless of the lack of a written statement.
Subsequent to this decision, the Courts of England have
continued to abide by this ruling and have rallied to their
view of a large majority of the State Courts. There are still a
few American states, indeed a decided minority, which hold
that such a promise of indemnity is within the Statute of
Frauds. Those generally referred to as comprising this
class are South Carolina, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Ohio and
Missouri.
4. 10 A. & E. 453.
5. L. R. 19 Eq. 198.
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It certainly is not to be commended that Missouri should
concur with those in the minority. Lawyers explain that the
leading contra case of Bissig v. Britton" (1875), supplying the
Missouri rule, supports Green v. Cresswell only because the
later decision of Wiles v. Dudlow had not yet reached the
state courts. The facts of the case were briefly these: The
plaintiff at the defendant's request became surety on one
Wisner's bond, with the oral assurance that the defendant
would indemnify him against loss. The court decided that
Wisner was primarily liable on the bond and that the defend-
ant's promise was to answer for the default of another and
thus within the Statute of Frauds.
Missouri Courts are not only among the minority on this
question, but seem proud of the fact that they are consistently
following an English precedent which had already been over-
ruled at the time Bissig v. Britton was decided. The rule of
this case has never been varied in the Missouri Courts. Fol-
lowing this opinion are Hurt v. Ford7 in 1897, Fressell v.
Williams 8 in 1901 and Gansey v. Orr 9 in 1902, which hold a
promise of indemnity within the Statute of Frauds. It is to
be hoped that Missouri will soon adopt the more reasonable
and practical view, and thus bring to our courts on this ques-
tion the same high esteem which has generally been accorded
them by other American tribunals.
DOROTHY HAIZLIP, '22.
6. 59 Mo. 204.
7. 142 Mo. 301.
8. 87 Mo. App. 528.
9. 173 Mo. 546.
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